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Abstract 
Contrary to earlier predictions, communitarization in the area of asylum policies has not 
led to an erosion of refugee rights. Instead, there is growing evidence that EU asylum 
harmonization has safeguarded existing standards and even enhanced the rights of 
asylum-seekers and refugees in Europe. We seek to explain this by building on the 
insights of principal-agent theory. We argue that delegation to supranational institutions 
can strengthen non-majoritarian policy dynamics and shield EU policy-makers from 
populist pressures for further immigration restrictions that national governments are 
often confronted with. We support this argument empirically through a systematic 
longitudinal analysis of the evolution of EU asylum policies. In particular, we seek to 
assess the motivation for and impact of greater delegation to EU institutions on rights 
developments for asylum-seekers and refuges. We also explain to what extent EU policy-
making has changed with the EU’s response to the ‘Syrian refugee crisis’. 
Key words: Asylum, European Union Institutions, Justice and Home Affairs, Minority 
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EU asylum cooperation and the rights of refugees in Europe  
Immigration and asylum matters have long been critically observed by the public. In the 
UK’s referendum on the European Union (EU), they were highly politicised by 
supporters of the leave campaign, who fuelled strong anti-immigrant attitudes present 
among large parts of the electorate, arguing that leaving the EU would stop uncontrolled 
immigration to the UK (Dathan, 2016). But this of course is not just a British 
phenomenon. Across the EU large parts of the electorate favour a decrease in 
immigration, which makes even moderate parties from across the political spectrum 
adopt anti-immigrant positions (Alonso and Claro da Fonseca, 2012, p. 867). Given 
widespread public resentment, policy-makers face a dilemma as the logic of majoritarian 
politics calling for further restrictions often stands in contrast to the basic human rights 
obligations of liberal states, particularly those concerning the protection of refugees. 
Historically, non-majoritarian institutions, such as national courts, have provided a 
counterweight to populist pressures for restricting minority rights and played an 
important role in safeguarding states’ adherence to basic human rights of migrants 
(Joppke, 2001).  
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The rise of EU co-operation has been viewed by many as threatening that role (e.g. Fry, 
2005; Hathaway, 2003). It has been argued that EU policy-making has strengthened the 
role of the executive, reduced accountability and limited judicial oversight in European 
policy-making. Some have even viewed the EU level as a strategic venue chosen by those 
who want to adopt more restrictive policies across Europe (Guiraudon, 2000). Recent 
developments such as the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement on the return of forced migrants 
to Turkey have again highlighted such concerns. 
When assessing the broader impact of the EU, predictions about an EU-induced erosion 
of migrants’ rights increasingly seem at odds with the empirical reality. Studies point to 
numerous examples where adopting common standards has necessitated legislative 
changes and the adoption of rights-enhancing policies in the Member States (Kaunert, 
2009; Kaunert, 2010; El-Enany and Thielemann, 2011; Kaunert and Léonard, 2012; 
Zaun, 2016, 2017). However, theoretical attempts to explain such dynamics have, with 
notable exceptions (Kaunert, 2009, 2010; Kaunert and Léonard, 2012; Zaun, 2016, 2017), 
remained limited. Zaun (2016; 2017), for instance, argues that liberalizations during the 
first phase of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) can be explained by the 
dominance of ‘strong regulators’ (i.e. states with a long regulatory tradition in the field 
and a well-functioning administration) trying to impose their standards on ‘weak 
regulators’. However, this argument is unable to explain standards exceeding the lowest 
common denominator of the strong regulators. Kaunert (2009, 2010) and Kaunert and 
Léonard (2012) have argued that the EU’s technocratic and legalistic approach can 
account for EU asylum policy liberalization. Yet, it remains puzzling why Member States 
with their alleged restrictive preferences would delegate to institutions that produce 
policies at odds with these preferences.  
This article draws on the principle-agent literature to advance our theoretical 
understanding of the motivation and the consequences of delegating asylum policy-
making to EU institutions. It argues that by delegating agenda-setting, decision-making 
and implementation in the area of asylum to EU institutions (the agents), national 
governments (the principals) strengthen non-majoritarian policy dynamics that shield 
European policy-makers from some of the populist pressures that national governments 
face (Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002, p. 2). We therefore expect more non-majoritarian 
policy dynamics to promote more liberal (less restrictive) standards. Hence, the more 
communitarized EU asylum policies are, the more likely they will safeguard or strengthen 
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minority rights. The concepts of non-majoritarian and majoritarian institutions are best 
understood as two ends of a continuum rather than two clearly distinguishable 
alternatives. The European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) are certainly the least subject to electoral pressures among the EU institutions.1 
The European Parliament (EP) takes a middle-ground position. As an elected body, the 
EP is per definition a majoritarian institution. Yet, when speaking of non-majoritarian 
institutions, we focus on their separation from anti-immigrant attitudes existing in the 
wider national electorate. Arguably, the EP is much better shielded from populist 
pressures than national parliaments, and its greater distance from voters has long been 
subject to criticism (see Marquand, 1979, p. 64 on ‘democratic deficit’). Not only is the 
turnout of voters substantially lower than in national elections, political parties in the EP 
also represent a variety of cleavages, as they are composed of parties from Member 
States that share limited communalities. Being composed of representatives from 
national ministries, the Council is certainly the ‘most majoritarian’ among the EU 
institutions. Yet, working in a less transparent and more complex institutional 
environment, the Council’s decisions are under less severe scrutiny than national 
government decisions, which enables the Council to shift blame for unpopular policies to 
Brussels.   
Empirically, we support our argument through a comparative analysis of EU asylum 
standards before and after the introduction of ordinary legislative procedure. This 
assessment will be complemented with a discussion about the extent to which non-
majoritarian policy dynamics and their rights-enhancing effects have been challenged by 
the EU’s response to the 2015 ‘Syrian Crisis’.  
Escaping populism through delegation: the role of non-majoritarian politics in 
EU policy-making 
Motivation for delegation 
‘Principal-agent’ theory and its application to the EU (Pollack, 1997, p. 103-104; 
Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002, p. 4) suggest two types of motivation for delegation 
which are important in the area of asylum: enhancing the credibility of commitments and 
enabling unpopular decisions such as the protection of minority rights which are often 
                                                             
1
 While the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is not directly part of the EU architecture, 
delegation to this court can also have an important impact on asylum policy-making, as the CJEU and the 
ECtHR have been demonstrated to cross-reference each other on a regular basis in different areas of EU 
policy-making (Jacobs, 2003). 
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underrepresented in majoritarian systems. It has been persuasively argued that, first, 
delegation can limit free-riding opportunities by enhancing the credibility of a 
commitment, and second, that it allows policy-makers to escape the ‘diktat’ of the 
majority and the short-term focus that often characterises policies emerging from 
majoritarian institutions adhering to the logic of electoral cycles (Thatcher and Stone 
Sweet, 2002, p. 4 & p. 9-10).  
Thatcher and Stone Sweet (2004, p. 4) also highlight that principals establish agents to 
resolve problems of commitment in the case of collective action problems, e.g. between 
multiple principles. Delegation in the EU context is therefore not necessarily a 
symmetrical process, initiated by all Member States to the same extent. Instead, those 
Member States that have the impression that others are free-riding use delegation to 
prevent them from doing so. Moreover, delegation provides ‘principals’ with 
opportunities to escape populist pressures and legislate on controversial issues, such as 
asylum policy. Thus, they can avoid paying the electoral price that legislation in this area 
often implies for moderate parties, given the widespread restrictive preferences of the 
electorate (Alonso and Claro da Fonseca, 2012; Howard, 2010) and the fact that populist 
parties are always ready to adopt more restrictive positions. Due to the restrictive 
preferences of the electorate, policy-makers will feel forced to adopt restrictive policies, 
even if this risks bringing their country into conflict with its obligations under 
international law. This is particularly the case when right-wing populist parties hold a 
significant part of the electorate (Howard, 2010, p. 744). Delegation provides national 
policy-makers with additional leeway, as policy outcomes at the EU level will not be 
immediately associated with them and even enable them to blame ‘Brussels’ for 
unpopular decisions.  
The expected impact of delegation 
In the case of European asylum policies, delegation to EU institutions can be expected to 
safeguard protection standards for asylum-seekers by isolating European policy-making 
from populist pressures at home. This, of course, follows partly from the motivation for 
delegation. However, EU institutions have also been demonstrated to engage in 
‘bureaucratic drift’, promoting positions that are different from those of their principals 
(Pollack, 1997, p. 108; Burley and Mattli, 1993). Therefore, it is also possible that the EU 
institutions (the agents) adopt positions that are more pro-integrationist and more liberal 
than Member States could subscribe to.  
5 
 
When the decision-making rules are more supranational, the influence of non-
majoritarian institutions like the Commission can be expected to be greater. Hence one 
would expect higher (less restrictive) standards the more supranational (communitarized) 
these rules are.    
European migration governance has been fundamentally transformed over the past three 
decades. Today’s governance rules for asylum matters under the Lisbon Treaty operate 
under the same supranational arrangements existing for the most integrated parts of the 
EU project, i.e. the Single Market. Through delegation, we can expect an increasing 
influence of the (more) liberal preferences of ‘supranational agents’ on policy outcomes 
at all three stages of the policy-making process: agenda-setting, decision-making, and 
policy implementation.   
The Commission now holds the monopoly of legislative initiatives and has enhanced its 
influence as decisions in the Council are taken by qualified majority voting (and no 
longer by unanimity) (Pollack, 1997, p. 106). The EP is a co-legislator with full veto 
powers and the CJEU has the authority to adjudicate over both the making and the 
implementation of EU policies. Delegation can also limit discretion and non-compliance 
during implementation as EU institutions can help with the ‘completion of incomplete 
contracts’ and provide independent oversight. As Burley and Mattli (1993) have shown, 
delegation to the CJEU can play a crucial role in narrowing implementation gaps. With 
the Lisbon Treaty, Member States have extended the delegation of powers to the CJEU. 
No longer is the preliminary reference procedure limited to national courts or last 
instance courts, but instead it is now available to all national courts (House of Lords 
European Union Committee, 2008, p. 125-26). Judicial activism likely further 
strengthened the impact of these newly delegated powers.  
Of course, the increased powers of non-majoritarian institutions do not imply that the 
Council has become a marginal actor in EU asylum policy-making. However, ceteris 
paribus non-majoritarian institutions are likely to have a stronger impact in the second 
phase than in the first phase of the CEAS, given the more communitarised decision-
making mode applied. As their positions are more liberal than those of the Council, 
policy outputs are therefore likely to be more liberal.  
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Why Member States have delegated asylum policy-making to the EU 
Member States have opted for delegation to EU institutions in asylum policy-making for 
two reasons. First, they deployed delegation to limit dynamics of ‘responsibility-shifting’. 
While previous cooperation in a purely intergovernmental setting already tried to 
overcome these dynamics, it was not able to achieve this goal, because commitments 
could not be enforced (Stetter, 2000). Second, through delegating to the technocratic EU 
decision-making environment, asylum policies, which have often been exploited by right-
wing populist parties (Rydgren, 2004), are being depoliticised.    
Responsibility-shifting follows from collective action problems in refugee protection. 
According to Suhrke (1998) the security gains resulting from refugee protection have 
some characteristics of a non-excludable public good. States therefore have an incentive 
to free-ride on others. As refugee protection involves costs, states adopt restrictive 
policies to encourage asylum-seekers to seek protection elsewhere. In the EU, this can 
lead to a regulatory ‘race to the bottom’ as Member States adopt more restrictive policies 
to become less attractive to asylum-seekers relative to other Member States (Thielemann, 
2006). These dynamics could be observed before asylum policies were delegated to the 
EU. In the 1990s, Northern European Member States received the largest share of 
asylum- seekers in Europe. To curb free-riding and to advance a more equitable sharing 
of refugee responsibilities across Europe, these states had an interest in enhanced 
communitarization. Germany was a particularly fervent supporter of harmonization and 
quota-based responsibility-sharing mechanisms at the EU level during the negotiations of 
the Maastricht Treaty and the early negotiations of the Amsterdam Treaty. However, 
when asylum applications started to decline again, Germany’s enthusiasm for further 
delegation to the EU also cooled. During the negotiations of the Constitutional Treaty 
(that ultimately resulted in the Lisbon Treaty), Germany blocked full harmonization, 
while the UK became the main supporter of greater delegation at the time as its numbers 
of asylum applications were the highest in Europe (Zaun 2017, p. 67). As soon as 
applications to the UK declined again, it lost interest in enhanced EU cooperation and 
even opted out of much of the second phase of the CEAS (Thielemann and El-Enany, 
2013, p. 220). 
The analysis of the negotiations of EU asylum instruments over the years support the 
argument that greater delegation to the EU was perceived to limit free-riding by 
preventing Member States from encouraging secondary movements through unilateral 
policy restrictions. This logic was effectively summarised in a Council discussion paper 
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on the reception conditions directive in which the French delegation promoted greater 
EU policy harmonization, suggesting that the “[t]he disparity between reception 
arrangements in Europe makes certain Member States more attractive than others for 
asylum applicants. Harmonization in this respect would reduce these secondary 
movements […]” (Council of Ministers, 2000a). 
The desire of national politicians to de-politicise refugee policy-making in order to lower 
the ‘temperature’ of the domestic debates on asylum and to prevent populist parties from 
exploiting the issue has been another motivation for delegation that can be supported 
through evidence. In the case of Germany, for instance, asylum was a hotly debated issue 
in the early 1990s and populism fuelled multiple attacks on immigrants. There was thus 
strong consensus among policy-makers to avoid new legislative debates on asylum. 
According to a well-placed observer of the German debates at the time, politicians know 
that asylum and migration policies “are perfect topics to lose an election with, if you are 
not careful” or more specifically “topic[s] that can cost moderate parties their head, 
because they cannot convince the voter […], whilst populist parties are […] 
strengthened” (Interview, Think Tank 1). A former official from the German Interior 
Ministry confirms: “After arsons directed against refugee reception centres in 1992/1993 
[…] politicians had a strong interest in asylum policies not being discussed publicly 
again” (Interview, Interior Ministry_DE). Another example supports our assumption 
that policy-makers mainly fear punishment by an anti-immigrant electorate. When asked 
about the reason why Member States de jure maintain a highly inefficient distribution 
mechanism (Dublin III) which is no longer applied in practice, they respond that Dublin 
has mainly symbolic functions and should signal the electorate that policy-makers keep 
tight control over refugee inflows (Interview, Consultant). The EU was considered an 
attractive alternative venue to the national arena, because EU policy-making processes 
were more obscure, technical, and de-politicized.  
The impact of non-majoritarian dynamics on European asylum standards  
To empirically assess the impact of non-majoritarian dynamics, we will, first, compare the 
three principal legal instruments developed during the first phase of the CEAS between 
2000 and 20052 with their ‘recasts’ during the second CEAS phase from 2008 until 2013.3 
                                                             
2 These are the Reception Conditions Directive (Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003), the 
Qualification Directive (Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004) and the Asylum Procedures 
Directive (Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005).  
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The first and the second phase of the CEAS are ‘most similar cases’ (cf. Seawright and 
Gerring, 2008, p. 304-306), except for the decision-making procedures, which are only 
partly communitarized in the first phase of the CEAS but fully communitarized in its 
second phase. This represents the design of a ‘natural experiment’ and allows us to hold 
all variables constant except for the one under investigation, namely the strengthened 
competences of non-majoritarian institutions through increased delegation. Focusing on 
the Reception Conditions Directive, we then trace the role of non-majoritarian dynamics 
on policy outputs at the EU level (policy on paper). In this context, we first study the 
agenda-setting role of the Commission and the CJEU as well as the influence of the EP. 
Second, we look into the Commission’s and the CJEU’s role in holding Member States 
accountable in the implementation process (policy in practice).  
Comparing policy output on the three core directives 
Comparing the policy output in the three core directives across the two periods, we find 
rights enhancements on most policies (cf. Table 1). The Reception Conditions Directive 
is now applied to all applicants (scope), including those that are subject to procedures 
under the Dublin Regulation and accelerated or border procedures. The special reception 
needs of vulnerable applicants are to be accounted for and an exhaustive list on 
detention grounds is introduced prohibiting arbitrary detention or detention on other 
grounds. Access to work is now permitted after nine months instead of twelve months in 
the original directive. Lastly, the directive introduces limits for the grounds on which 
Member States may set different modalities for material reception conditions, requiring 
access to health care and a dignified living standard even where material reception 
conditions are reduced and withdrawn, while no longer considering late submission of an 
application as a ground for the refusal of reception conditions. The special needs of 
vulnerable applicants are now also to be recognised.    
The family definition of the Qualification Directive is extended and minor children of 
international protection beneficiaries are no longer explicitly required to be dependent. In 
the definition of actors of protection, a requirement is introduced that such protection 
needs to be effective and non-temporary and the internal protection alternative is only 
applied if the person can settle there, not withstanding technical obstacles. The rights of 
refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection are furthermore aligned and gender 
                                                                                                                                                                              
3 These are the recast reception conditions directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013, the recast Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and 
the Council of 13 December 2011 and the recast Asylum Procedures Directive of 2013/32/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013.  
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and gender identity are criteria to be accounted for when assessing membership of a 
‘particular social group’.  
Following the Procedures Directive asylum-seekers should have access to a procedure 
with clear deadlines for the registration of the asylum apllication. In addition to free legal 
aid in case of negative decisions provided by the original Procedures Directive, the recast 
directive grants free legal aid at first instance procedures. Moreover, it strengthens access 
to an effective remedy by establishing the right to a full and ex nunc examination of facts, 
requiring courts to base their judgment not only on facts established during the first 
instance procedure but also to consider new relevant information. The legislative output 
on the personal interview is rather mixed. On the one hand, the possibility to omit it is 
now limited to cases where a positive decision can be taken or where the applicant is 
considered unable to be interviewed. On the other hand, the possibility to temporarily 
involve personnel of another authority is introduced to account for times of a high 
volume of applications, which risks involving inadequately trained personnel. 
Additionally, the right to remain in case of subsequent applications is further limited in 
cases where no additional information substantiating the claim is submitted and where 
the subsequent claim is made “merely in order to the delay or frustrate the enforcement 
of a decision” (art. 41 para. 1 lit. a). 
In sum, there are far more rights enhancements than downgrades in all asylum directives 
of the second phase of the CEAS. Contrary to the expectations in much of the literature, 
increased delegation to the EU goes hand in hand with more (rather than fewer) rights 
for asylum-seekers and refugees in Europe. As Table 1 shows, the Commission and, to a 
slightly lesser extent, the EP consistently advance more liberal positions compared to 
both the status quo and those advanced by the institution most strongly connected to 
national electorates, the Council. This supports our expectation that the Commission has 
the strongest non-majoritarian characteristics among the three institutions, while the 
Council is most majoritarian and the EP takes somewhat of a ‘middle ground’ position 
between the two. While the Parliament has been demonstrated to adopt more 
conservative positions during the second phase of the CEAS (Ripoll Servent and 
Trauner, 2014, pp. 1148-1149), this may be attributed to the fact that it is now a co-
legislator taking an active part in the negotiations and thus needing to compromise with 
the Council to promote their positions on various issues. In consultation procedure, it 
could only make itself heard by adopting extreme positions that could clearly be 
identified as coming from the EP. As it is not a co-legislator, the Commission took the 
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role of the visionary in the second phase of the CEAS and suggested comparatively 
progressive policies on the recast Procedures Directive, the recast Reception Conditions 
Directive, and the Dublin III Regulation. Yet, as all these proposals were considered too 
progressive by some Member States in the Council (Interview, PermRep#1; Interview, 
PermRep#2; Interview, PermRep#3; Interview, PermRep#4), it had to revise them.  
Hence, while neither the Commission nor the EP always get their maximum positions 
into EU legislation, their original positions are usually more liberal than the status quo and, 
as we will show later, they are able to draw legislative output more effectively towards 
their preferred output in the second phase of the CEAS.  
Some scholars have questioned the significance of these changes and referred to them as 
“changes of secondary order” (Ripoll Servent and Trauner, 2014, p. 1153). Yet, while EU 
standards could certainly be higher and retain the focus on controlling the immigration 
of asylum-seekers (Ripoll Servent and Trauner, 2014, p. 1142), these changes lead to 
important rights enhancements for asylum-seekers and refugees in several EU Member 
States. For example, some Member States employed detention as a general practice for 
new asylum-seekers. In Malta, asylum-seekers were detained as a matter of course, which 
under the new EU provisions is no longer possible (Interview, PermRep#2). Earlier 
labour market access in Germany and France can potentially improve the integration of 
asylum-seekers that were denied it previously. The internal protection alternative is often 
used to provide applicants with a ‘leave to remain’ but to deny them an actual status, 
even where they could not be returned due to technical obstacles.    
 
< Insert Table 1 about here >                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
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The agenda-setting powers of the Commission and the European Courts  
In this section, we will explain raised standards through the enhanced agenda-setting powers of 
non-majoritarian institutions. Although they are interlinked, we distinguish two types of agenda-
setting. The first type is the Commission’s agenda-setting through its right of initiative. As 
suggested earlier, the Commission’s agenda-setting powers are enhanced under qualified majority 
vote in the Council, because Member States can be outvoted and the Commission proposal does 
not need to accommodate all outliers but can instead set a course. The second type of agenda-
setting powers relates to the judicial review of the CJEU. If the CJEU rules that a national 
practice is out of line with EU law, a need for further EU legislation is created, closing potential 
gaps in the already existing instruments. Additionally, the increased ‘juridification’ (Kaunert and 
Léonard, 2012) has enhanced the competences of the ECtHR, which has already drawn on EU 
legislation to substantiate its argumentation (see the judgment MSS vs. Belgium and Greece, 
ECtHR, 2011). In the following section, we will illustrate the two types of enhanced agenda-
setting powers, using the examples of access to work and detention from the Reception 
Conditions Directive.   
    
Access to work 
Access to work was considered one of the most controversial issues from the very beginning of 
the negotiations. It was among the most contested issues in the first and the second phase of the 
CEAS. Some Member States (e.g. France and Germany) feared that an early labour market 
access could be a pull-factor that would increase the number of applicants. Other Member States 
(e.g. Sweden and the Netherlands) and the Commission argued that early access would help to 
integrate asylum-seekers and alleviate pressures on national welfare systems (Council of 
Ministers, 2000b: 2; Interview, PermRep#3; Interview, PermRep#4). 
In the original directive, access to work was granted after one year. The recast directive provides 
it after nine months. This is more liberal than the standard provided in two traditionally strong 
Member States, Germany and France. These Member States favoured late access to work in 
order to send a signal both to potential asylum-seekers and the electorate (Interview, Consultant) 
and had blocked any attempts of the Commission and other Member States to introduce earlier 
access in the original Reception Conditions Directive (Zaun, 2016, p. 145-146). The higher 
protection standard provided by the recast directive can be explained through the enhanced role 
of non-majoritarian institutions.   
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Debates on the recast Reception Conditions Directive were initiated by the Commission and 
were based on the implementation studies of the Commission, NGOs, and groups of legal 
experts which highlighted gaps and inconsistencies in implementation resulting from ambiguous 
wording in the directives. As access to work was, again, considered a core issue in the directive, 
the Commission dedicated a whole paragraph to it in the introduction, elaborating why access 
should be granted after six months – six months earlier than in the original Reception 
Conditions Directive (European Commission, 2008, p. 5). 
With the qualified majority vote in the Council, the Commission’s agenda-setting power was 
enhanced and Germany and France, the only Member States to oppose access to work earlier 
than twelve months, could no longer block it. The nine months laid down in the directive 
represent a compromise between the Commission’s position to have it after six months 
(European Commission, 2008, p. 24) and these two restrictive Member States (Council of 
Ministers, 2012, p. 39). Initially the EP sided with the Commission, advancing labour market 
access after six months (European Parliament, 2009). Eventually, however, the EP and the 
Council met in the middle and agreed on a maximum-period of nine months. At the same time 
the EP accepted the Council’s demand to keep most of the existing conditions, e.g. asylum-
seekers will only have access to the labour market if no decision has been taken on their claim 
within the period of nine months (Peers, 2012, p. 5).  
  
Detention 
The practice of detaining asylum-seekers during the application procedures has always been 
criticized by NGOs (ECRE, 1996). However, Member States sought to keep tight control of this 
issue during the first phase of the CEAS. The original Reception Conditions Directive does not 
define the conditions under which Member States may or may not detain asylum-seekers. The 
recast directive introduces an article proposing that only a limited number of detention grounds 
are valid (art. 8). The five exclusive reasons for detention are (a) verification of identity, (b) 
determination of elements which can only be obtained through detention (e.g. in case of a risk of 
absconding), (c) related to a decision on the right to enter the territory in an asylum procedure, 
(d) in case of repeat applications submitted by applicants who try to circumvent detention for 
return/extradition, (e) when protection of national security or public order so requires. 
Moreover, asylum-seekers shall not be detained for the sole reason that they apply for asylum 
(para. 1) and detention is conditional in the individual assessment of each case (para. 2). This 
article was inserted “taking into consideration the wide use of detention for asylum-seekers by 
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Member States and the developing case law of the European Court of Human Rights” 
(European Commission, 2008, p. 6). The case law referred to by the Commission is that of Saadi 
v. the United Kingdom (ECtHR, 2008). In this case the dissenting vote of six judges held that 
art. 18 para. 1 of the Procedures Directive should be considered an adjunct to the rules set in art. 
7 of the reception conditions directive. Thus, “Member States shall not hold a person in 
detention for the sole reason that he/she is an applicant for asylum”. The Commission makes 
the same link between the procedures directive and the reception conditions directive in their 
legislative proposal. This is reflected in para. 1 of the article. 
The provision that detention should be made conditional on the individual assessment of a case 
goes back to Recommendation Rec(2003)5 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on 
measures of detention of asylum-seekers. According to paragraph 4 of this recommendation, 
“[m]easures of detention of asylum-seekers should be applied only after a careful examination of 
their necessity in each individual case”. According to the recommendation detention is lawful 
“when protection of national security and public order so requires” which made its way into 
para. 2 lit. e.  
Para. 2 lit. c is an exception which was already confirmed by most ECtHR judges (eleven) in the 
case of Saadi v. the United Kingdom. According to them the practice of the UK to detain 
applicants to accelerate the asylum procedure did not violate art. 5 para. 1 ECHR (right to liberty 
and security), as each state has the right to decide to whom it grants access to its territory (para. 
65).  
Following Conclusion No. 44 of the Executive Committee of the UNHCR Programme, the 
UNHCR’s Guidelines, and the Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation, detention of asylum-
seekers is lawful under certain circumstances, e.g. while identity checks are taking place, when 
elements comprising the asylum claim need to be determined or when public order requires. This 
is reflected in para. 2 lit. a, b and e. 
Four out of these five grounds for detention were already part of the Commission proposal 
(European Commission, 2008, p. 20). Only one ground was added by the Council, which stated 
in lit. d that applicants can be detained for purposes of expulsion if the Member States can show 
that the person concerned only applied for asylum to delay the procedure.  
Some Member States wanted to add additional grounds for detention. One Member State 
suggested adding a lack of co-operation by the asylum-seeker while another Member State 
wanted to introduce illegal entry as a ground for detention (Council of Ministers, 2010b, p. 3, 
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footnote 6). This likely was Malta, as Malta usually detained asylum-seekers for irregular entry 
(PermRep#2). The Commission, however, argued that adding such vague grounds could lead to 
systematic detention of asylum-seekers (Council of Ministers, 2010b, p. 3, footnote 6). 
Eventually, the EP convinced the Council to drop apprehension for an irregular stay as a 
detention ground. The EP and the Commission, moreover, ensured that detention as part of 
expulsion was limited to cases in which the return directive applied (Peers, 2012, p. 4). 
The case of detention shows that the Commission (and the EP) used court rulings as a tool for 
introducing safeguards for asylum-seekers in detention and to limit the number of detention 
grounds. 
The role of the Commission and the EU Court in holding Member States to account  
Both the Commission and the CJEU had a right to enforce refugees’ and asylum-seekers’ rights 
in the implementation phase as well and thus could and did raise standards in policy outcomes. 
For instance, the Commission could initiate infringement procedures against states for non-
implementation and the courts could assess whether Member States’ implementation was in line 
with EU law.  
In the first phase only the Court made use of its right to enforce more effective implementation. 
While the Commission had initiated an infringement procedure against Greece for non-
implementation of art. 26 of the original Reception Conditions Directive, it did not initiate a 
single content-related infringement procedure. Yet, there was a wide consensus that a number of 
Member States, particularly in Southern Europe and some of the new Eastern European 
Member States, had not correctly transposed the directives, maintaining severe deficiencies in 
their asylum systems. At the height of the 2015 crisis, the Commission eventually initiated 
infringement procedures: 40 infringement decisions against Member States were launched in 
September 2015 for non-implementation of EU legislation and in December 2015 the 
Commission initiated an infringement procedure against Greece, Croatia, Italy, Malta and 
Hungary for non-implementation of the CEAS (Carrera et al., 2015, p. 14; European 
Commission, 2015).  
The CJEU, which was often informed by judgement of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), left an even stronger mark on EU legislation. The ECtHR decisions MSS v Belgium 
and Greece (ECtHR, 2011) and Tarakhel v Switzerland (ECtHR 2014) and the CJEU decision 
NS vs. Netherlands (CJEU, 2011) have determined the insufficiencies of Southern European 
asylum systems and demonstrated that these Member States had not fully transposed EU asylum 
directives. In MSS v Belgium and Greece an Afghan citizen filed an asylum application in 
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Belgium after entering through Greece. In line with Dublin II, he was sent back to Greece and 
detained in degrading conditions, and became homeless upon his release with no access to work 
or social benefits. The ECtHR suggested that Greece had not transposed the Reception 
Conditions Directive (and the Procedures Directive) and ruled that Greece’s detention and 
reception conditions violated art. 3 ECHR, which prohibits torture and inhuman and degrading 
treatment. Moreover, the Court ruled that Greece had violated art. 13 ECHR (right to an 
effective remedy) in conjunction with art. 3 ECHR. This was due to the deficiencies of the 
asylum procedure and the risk the claimant faced in being returned to his country of origin 
without thorough examination of fact and law and access to a legal remedy. Belgium, too, had 
violated art. 3 ECHR for exposing the applicant to the degrading detention and living conditions 
in Greece without prior assessment of the situation. It had thus also violated art. 13 ECHR in 
conjunction with art. 3 ECHR, as it did not provide any access to legal remedies in the 
framework of Dublin transfers. The Court said that “any complaint that expulsion to another 
country will expose an individual to treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention requires 
close and rigorous scrutiny and that, subject to a certain margin of appreciation left to the States, 
conformity with Article 13 requires that the competent body must be able to examine the 
substance of the complaint and afford proper reparation” (ECtHR, 2011, p. 80-81). Eventually, 
this ruling led to a de facto suspension of Dublin transfers to Greece. In Tarakhel v Switzerland 
(ECtHR, 2014) this ruling was confirmed and extended to Italy. This further questioned the 
legitimacy and practicability of the Dublin system. Shortly after MSS v Belgium and Greece, the 
CJEU (2011) ruled in NS v UK and ME and others v Ireland that a Dublin transfer is not 
allowed when the transferring Member State “cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in 
the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum-seekers in that Member State 
amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being 
subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the [EU] 
Charter” (paras. 94 and 106). The CJEU judgment is remarkable, as the CJEU to some extent 
questioned the mutual recognition of asylum decisions under all circumstances and hence 
fostered a retrenchment in European integration. The CJEU has often been described as 
strongly pro-integrationist (Burley and Mattli, 1993). Yet, in this case it prioritised the human 
rights standards laid down in the EU Charter. The adoption of the Charter with the Lisbon 
Treaty seems to have furthered CJEU’s role as a guardian of human rights, even at the expense 




This paper has demonstrated that transferring asylum policies to the EU level does not decrease 
the number of checks and balances policy-makers are faced with, particularly with the move 
towards the ordinary legislative procedure. It therefore should not be viewed as an act of 
restrictive venue-shopping as previously argued by scholars. Instead, the EU level policy-making 
provides mechanisms that tend to safeguard and strengthen minority rights, even when Member 
States in the Council have more restrictive preferences. Analyzing EU asylum policy-making 
from a principal-agent perspective helps to understand why the Commission, the CJEU and the 
EP –institutions that are more insulated from majoritarian pressures than national governments 
– have consistently adopted policy positions that are less restrictive than those of the Council. 
Delegation to supranational institutions strengthens non-majoritarian governance and allows 
national governments to depoliticize unpopular migration policies. In turn, such delegation helps 
to safeguard minority rights against populist pressures for greater restrictions. Delegation 
dynamics can therefore account for the fact that common EU policies go beyond the ‘lowest 
common denominator’ and are often less restrictive even than policies found in Member States 
that are ‘strong regulators’ (see Zaun 2016).   
Two principal objections can be raised with regards to the arguments developed above. First, 
while the authority and influence of non-majoritarian institutions in policy-making has increased, 
Member States often remain in the driving seat when it comes to the implementation of EU 
policies. This can lead to highly heterogeneous outcomes across the Member States, which can 
make a mockery of new safeguards and new rights agreed to at the EU level. While we have 
recently been able to observe a greater ability by the Commission and the CJEU to hold Member 
States accountable over implementation, it is important to acknowledge that strengthened 
standards on paper are only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for greater safeguards on 
the ground. However, recent Commission proposals to transform some of the EU’s core asylum 
directives into regulations to reduce Member State discretion (European Commission 2016a, 
2016b) and initiatives to delegate greater authority to the European Asylum Support Office 
(Commission 2016c) over national implementation measures, are steps to promote better 
compliance and enforceability of commitments. Second, one might argue that the EU’s response 
to the Syrian crisis poses a challenge to our central claims, pointing to the highly restrictive 
nature of the EU-Turkey Statement (European Commission 2016d) and the limitations of the 
EU’s emergency response legislation, particularly with regard to relocation.  
However, we argue that these recent initiatives in fact strengthen our overall argument. What 
characterises EU agreements during a crisis is the severely limited involvement of supranational 
EU institutions and their reversion to more intergovernmental governance (see parallels with the 
17 
 
Eurocrisis as discussed by Puetter, 2014 or Bickerton et al., 2015). The EU-Turkey Statement, an 
intergovernmental agreement, is a case in point. The CJEU recently declared that neither the 
European Council nor any other institution of the EU was party of the agreement and therefore 
had no jurisdiction over it (CJEU2017). With regard to the heavily criticized emergency 
legislation on quota-based relocation (Council of Ministers 2015a, Council of Ministers 2015b), it 
is important to note that in adopting these ‘responsibility-sharing’ measures, Member States have 
decided to bypass the ordinary legislative procedure and instead base such legislation on Article 
78(3) (TFEU), which explicitly reverts the role of the European Parliament back to ‘consultation 
only’. It could be argued that this was done to speed up the legislation when a fast response was 
needed. But perhaps more importantly, it should act as reminder that Member States have 
generally been much more reluctant to delegate redistributive issues to supranational institutions 
while being more willing to delegate on regulatory matters (Majone 1996).  
Overall, the EU’s response to the crisis therefore strengthens our claim that the delegation to 
supranational, non-majoritarian, institutions strengthens minority rights in Europe. It also 
suggests that the greatest long-term impact of the EU in strengthening refugee protection should 
be expected to stem from the continuation of an incremental regulatory approach embedded in 
strong non-majoritarian governance dynamics and is unlikely to result from highly politicized 
intergovernmental bargains. While delegation strengthens minority rights and shields them from 
the preferences of latently anti-immigrant majorities, it is not unproblematic, as it may also 
further voters’ estrangement from both national and European politics. It may also reinforce the 
perception that political elites are detached from the worries and demands of their voters. This in 
turn has recently been shown to strengthen right-wing populism and Euroscepticism across 
Europe.    
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Table 1: Positions of the three legislative institutions on key issues (relative to status quo ante) and outcome of final agreement (relative 
to status quo ante) 
Directive Issue Commission1 European Parliament2 Council3 Final Agreement3 
RCD 
Scope + + 0 + 
Detention (Grounds for) ++ ++ 0 + 
Access to work ++ ++ 0 + 
Access to material reception conditions ++ + 0 + 
Vulnerable applicants with special reception needs ++ ++ 0 + 
QD 
Family definition ++ + 0 + 
Definition of actors of protection + + - + 
Internal Protection Alternative + + 0 + 
Rights of beneficiaries of subsidiary protection ++  + 0 + 
Gender-related persecution + + + + 
APD 
Access to procedure + + 0 + 
Rights related to personal interview + + 0 +/- 
Free legal information at 1st instance  ++ ++ 0 + 
Right to remain in case of subsequent applications - - - - 
Right to an effective remedy + + 0 + 
Key: + stronger safeguards and/or more rights compared to status quo 
++ stronger safeguards as compared to the other institutions on this specific issue; yet, this does not imply safeguards twice as high as + 
- weakened safeguards and/or reduced rights  
0 reflecting status quo 
Notes: 1The Commission’s position is based on the (first) recast proposal submitted by the Commission. 
2 The European Parliament’s position is based on its amendments on the (first) recast Commission proposal.  
3 The Council’s position is based on reactions by Member States lowest common denominator in the Council working groups at their first meeting subsequent 
to the submission of the Commission proposal.  
4 The assessment of the final agreements is based on the recast directives and evaluations of ECRE about the main changes. We follow ECREs interpretation 
regarding rights-enhancing and rights-reducing legislative output.   
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